But shouldn't the LFB review those other fires in London to find lessons? That isn't to say blame does not lie elswhere. It can be a combination of factors, but the part of the blame that is yours should be accepted. It isn't a case of manslaughter, but how things might have been done better under your watch.
The London Fire Brigade DOES review other fires in London, or certainly did in my late father's time, but implementation (or not) of their recommendations is down to politicians and planners as I said above. As I've mentioned elsewhere my father back in the sixties, seventies and early eighties tried desperately hard to get sprinklers accepted as standard in high rise buildings but the politicians and planners decided it was too expensive. This ancient history is relevant when you remember that Grenfell Tower was completed in 1974.
The London Fire Brigade's role with politicians and planners is rather like being the parent of a stroppy adolescent. You make recommendations and try to convince them why you say what you say but the bottom line is that the stroppy adolescent makes its own choice. That's what politicians and planners do.
After my father retired from the Brigade he did a lot of consultancy work and edited a book called Tolley's Fire Safety Management Handbook amongst other things. As part of his consultancy work he would meet with various what I'll call building specialists as a generic term to cover architects, surveyors, project managers etc. There would be a discussion about fire safety regulations and my father would make his point. The building specialist would often respond with something like 'the legislation is not meant to be interpreted in that way' to which my father would respond 'I wrote the legislation and that is how it should be interpreted.'
Despite all that they would often proceed and do what suited them.
You can lead a horse to water you cannot make it drink.
What I am getting at is Lakanal house in particular. I appreciate recommendations go to the government for action if action is needed, but I imagined lessons would be taken in relation to how these sort of fires should be fought by the LFB, including the advice given to residents, irrespective of whether a report is sitting on a minister's desk or not.
Surely lessons will be learned by the LFB from Grenfall and if Danny Cotton's words were correct it is worrying as she said they would not do anything differently. It feels a defensive response rather than one of a willingness to learn.
Muttley, on how many occasion has the policy worked though, you can't only look at the very rare failings to come to the conclusion that people are not learning from things.
Yes, but if you say you wouldn't have done anything differently, it is a very worrying thing to say. It isn't saying you have committed manslaughter, but if we had another Grenfall tomorrow, please god we never do, I don't want people being given the same advice if it is deemed to be wrong. Saying what she did was defensive and insensitive and I don't blame her for Grenfall, but the report has been critical and those criticisms need to be taken on board.
I thought the statistics showed that in towers like Grenfell with correct cladding the procedure still worked, but I can't be sure, maybe @Addickted Would know more.
So are you saying it was wrong of those conducting the investigation to criticise the LFB? It isn't about me, make it about them. My guess is that as knowledgeable that Addicted is, he is likely to be less knowledgeable than the people consulted in that investigation.
Well who are those people? I am not being confrontational, but if you are saying the LFB are being used to deflect the blame, it is a serious accusation. And why are they being protected?
I don't think you're being confrontation, don't worry, it's a conversation, we disagree, it's not a problem.
As for who is to blame, the council and contractors that used inferior, flammable cladding, the very same people who ignored various warnings from residents as to the safety of the building.
Why are they being protected? That's what happens to people in positions of power, sadly.
I don't think you're being confrontation, don't worry, it's a conversation, we disagree, it's not a problem.
As for who is to blame, the council and contractors that used inferior, flammable cladding, the very same people who ignored various warnings from residents as to the safety of the building.
Why are they being protected? That's what happens to people in positions of power, sadly.
I doubt they are being protected. I believe that section of the report is due in January
I believe Governments can, have and will continue to influence these reports, it's why we've seen so many whitewashes in the past, this is just another to add to the list.
I do accept I'm fair from an expert on this matter and may well be wrong, but my opinion has been formed after a lot of reading, almost all of which suggests the policiy is one that works.
I thought the statistics showed that in towers like Grenfell with correct cladding the procedure still worked, but I can't be sure, maybe @Addickted Would know more.
The 'stay put' policy is still valid on all blocks, including high rise accommodation - unless they are clad in ACM (aluminium composite material) cladding, where all blocks over ten stories will have a total evacuation policy (fire alarm system to sound across all floors, even if the fire occurs only on one floor) and where the LFB have produced a guidance note on a 'waking watch' of the building.
So are you saying it was wrong of those conducting the investigation to criticise the LFB? It isn't about me, make it about them. My guess is that as knowledgeable that Addicted is, he is likely to be less knowledgeable than the people consulted in that investigation.
Not only was I consulted - along with multiple fire safety specialists - but I was also heavily involved in the Hackett review of the Building Regulations involving fire safety (Approved Document B )
So are you saying it was wrong of those conducting the investigation to criticise the LFB? It isn't about me, make it about them. My guess is that as knowledgeable that Addicted is, he is likely to be less knowledgeable than the people consulted in that investigation.
Not only was I consulted - along with multiple fire safety specialists - but I was also heavily involved in the Hackett review of the Building Regulations involving fire safety (Approved Document
One thing that has struck me and I am putting it out there to be told why it is not possible, but you have helicopters that can dump water on forest fires in the US etc... Wouldn't something like this have been effective with Grenfall.
I'm convinced there will be prosecutions following the report. My understanding is that certainly won't be anyone in the LFB. I'd be surprised if the main contractor, specialist sub contractor, cladding supplier and the French cladding manufacturer along with the building control company who signed the work off, have a lot of questions to answer.
K&C TMO who managed the block were, I believe, following best practice, though I'd hate to be the risk assessor who signed off the fire safety of the building post retrofit or the validator.
The block had leaseholders in it - indeed one two bet flat was up for sale when the fire occurred (I believe it was on the market for £280k). All leaseholders in the block would have been served with a section 20 notice (of the Landlord & Tenant Act), informing them of the improvement works and giving them option to comment and be consulted on everything to do with the project - specifically the cost of each element of the work programme which they are able to find alternatives if they so wish.
Seeing as they are liable for a percentage of the cost of the works, I'm sure a saving in the cladding costs of £300k by changing it from zinc to aluminium - where to all intents and purposes the cladding was reported to perform in exactly the same way in a fire - would have interested them.
One thing that has struck me and I am putting it out there to be told why it is not possible, but you have helicopters that can dump water on forest fires in the US etc... Wouldn't something like this have been effective with Grenfall.
There's a few good answers here. Main reason seems to be the safety impact of dropping a large amount of water on a burning building that may be structurally unsafe. It could lead to burning debris being scattered. Not to mention the damage caused to ground level infrastructure, homes etc.
I'm convinced there will be prosecutions following the report. My understanding is that certainly won't be anyone in the LFB. I'd be surprised if the main contractor, specialist sub contractor, cladding supplier and the French cladding manufacturer along with the building control company who signed the work off, have a lot of questions to answer.
K&C TMO who managed the block were, I believe, following best practice, though I'd hate to be the risk assessor who signed off the fire safety of the building post retrofit or the validator.
The block had leaseholders in it - indeed one two bet flat was up for sale when the fire occurred (I believe it was on the market for £280k). All leaseholders in the block would have been served with a section 20 notice (of the Landlord & Tenant Act), informing them of the improvement works and giving them option to comment and be consulted on everything to do with the project - specifically the cost of each element of the work programme which they are able to find alternatives if they so wish.
Seeing as they are liable for a percentage of the cost of the works, I'm sure a saving in the cladding costs of £300k by changing it from zinc to aluminium - where to all intents and purposes the cladding was reported to perform in exactly the same way in a fire - would have interested them.
Realistically, a small number of leaseholders would have zero chance of being able to influence how the job was done and would have had a reasonable expectation it was going to be done safely without corners being cut. Any leaseholders should not have to pay any more money if they live in blocks that were wrongly cladded for this reason IMO.
I've had to change the window specification for a block of 32 flats on the say so of one leaseholder in the block. That saved £24k on the value of the contract and the individual just under £700.
If I believed the two cladding systems at Grenfell Tower performed in exactly the same way, complied with Building Regulations and had the appropriate Agrément Certificates (which the Reynobond PE cladding did possess), I might try and reduce my percentage of the bill by choosing the cheaper alternative. This was not the only change in specification following a value engineering exercise.
I've had to change the window specification for a block of 32 flats on the say so of one leaseholder in the block. That saved £24k on the value of the contract and the individual just under £700.
If I believed the two cladding systems at Grenfell Tower performed in exactly the same way, complied with Building Regulations and had the appropriate Agrément Certificates (which the Reynobond PE cladding did possess), I might try and reduce my percentage of the bill by choosing the cheaper alternative. This was not the only change in specification following a value engineering exercise.
What I am saying is no leasholder would want to compromise is her her personal safety - cost perhaps but they can't be expected to know and understand building regs. I know of leasholders who wanted repair work to walkways done by somebody other than Mears, but whilst they had the opportunity to raise concerns the council were always going to go with Mears - who consequently cocked it all up.
I'm not saying anything against Mears, not least as their CEO is a West Stand ST holder.
If the two different cladding types complied with all the relevant certification - which they did at the time of the fire - how would you know you were compromising your safety?
Basically, it looks like fraud to me if test results were not accurately published - similar to the VW emissions testing scam.
You couldn't possibly know, but as you say, somebody did. And there were fires before Grenfell where cladding acted like this. Why was this not addressed sooner. Not blaming anybody, but there has to be guilty parties here as you say.
You couldn't possibly know, but as you say, somebody did. And there were fires before Grenfell where cladding acted like this. Why was this not addressed sooner. Not blaming anybody, but there has to be guilty parties here as you say.
I do and they were.
Grenfell was unique in its severity. Been plenty of small fires where cladding has burnt - even had a low rise block I managed with exactly the same cladding as Grenfell, but it didn't spread as the block had the required fire breaks. It was a year old and in Coulsdon.
Comments
Surely lessons will be learned by the LFB from Grenfall and if Danny Cotton's words were correct it is worrying as she said they would not do anything differently. It feels a defensive response rather than one of a willingness to learn.
The things that need to be done differently are not in the hands of The LFB.
Anything to keep those really at fault out of prison, imo.
As for who is to blame, the council and contractors that used inferior, flammable cladding, the very same people who ignored various warnings from residents as to the safety of the building.
Why are they being protected? That's what happens to people in positions of power, sadly.
I do accept I'm fair from an expert on this matter and may well be wrong, but my opinion has been formed after a lot of reading, almost all of which suggests the policiy is one that works.
https://www.london-fire.gov.uk/media/1811/gn_90_lf_format.pdf
https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/grenfell-tower-fire-one-year-one-kensington-a8397276.html
K&C TMO who managed the block were, I believe, following best practice, though I'd hate to be the risk assessor who signed off the fire safety of the building post retrofit or the validator.
The block had leaseholders in it - indeed one two bet flat was up for sale when the fire occurred (I believe it was on the market for £280k). All leaseholders in the block would have been served with a section 20 notice (of the Landlord & Tenant Act), informing them of the improvement works and giving them option to comment and be consulted on everything to do with the project - specifically the cost of each element of the work programme which they are able to find alternatives if they so wish.
Seeing as they are liable for a percentage of the cost of the works, I'm sure a saving in the cladding costs of £300k by changing it from zinc to aluminium - where to all intents and purposes the cladding was reported to perform in exactly the same way in a fire - would have interested them.
https://www.quora.com/Why-didnt-the-British-government-use-aerial-firefighting-measures-to-put-out-the-Grenfell-Tower-fire
If I believed the two cladding systems at Grenfell Tower performed in exactly the same way, complied with Building Regulations and had the appropriate Agrément Certificates (which the Reynobond PE cladding did possess), I might try and reduce my percentage of the bill by choosing the cheaper alternative. This was not the only change in specification following a value engineering exercise.
If the two different cladding types complied with all the relevant certification - which they did at the time of the fire - how would you know you were compromising your safety?
Basically, it looks like fraud to me if test results were not accurately published - similar to the VW emissions testing scam.
Grenfell was unique in its severity. Been plenty of small fires where cladding has burnt - even had a low rise block I managed with exactly the same cladding as Grenfell, but it didn't spread as the block had the required fire breaks. It was a year old and in Coulsdon.